Recent Trends in U.S. Trade and Investment by Robert E. Lipsey
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
RECENTTRENDS IN U. S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT
Robert E. Lipsey
Working Paper No. 1009




Theresearch reportedon is partof the NBER's program in
International Studies. This paper was presentedas partofthe
NBER's studies of U.S.Trade Policy, Competitiveness, and Capital
Mobilityin the World Economy (NSF Grant No. PRA—8116459) and
Multinational Firms and Host—Country Technology (NSF Grant No.
8017543). I am indebted to Linda O'Connor for statistical
assistance and to Muriel Moeller for the preparation of the
manuscript. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and do
not necessarily represent those of the National Bureau of Economic
Research or the National Science Foi.mdation.NBER Working Paper #1009
October 1982
RECENT TRENDS IN U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT
Abstract
This paper reviews some of the main recent developments in U.S.
trade and overseas investment against the background of long—term trends.
The United States, and particularly the agricultural sector, has
become more linked with the rest of the world. The commodity distribution
of trade has moved toward being in large part an exchange of U.S. manu-
factured goods for other countriest manufactures even though the share
of developed countries in U.S. trade has declined. The fall in the U.S.
share of world trade which began around 1950 has slowed down or even
stopped, as has the fall in the terms of trade of the United States and
other developed countries.
The U.S. share of new direct investment outflows has fallen while
that of Japan and Germany have increased, but the United States has
become one of the major recipients of direct investment from other coun-
tries. U.S. firms have increasingly accepted less than 100per cent or
even majority ownership, but majority ownership is still the usual form,
by a large margin, in industries in which technology is important.
U.S.—owned affiliates in foreign countries, particularly those in the
smaller Asian countries, have shifted their activities towards exporting.
In most areas U.S. affiliates increased their exports more in recent
years than did other firms in their host countries, thus increasing
their share of exports from these countries.
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Trade and the U.S. Economy
U.S. Trade and Outjp
For much of its history the United States has beena relatively
isolated economy, in the sense that its trade with therest of the world
has been small relative to total output.During most of the 19th Century
and up until World War I merchandiseexports were around 6 to 7 per cent
of GNP. The Great Depression of the 1930'sdisrupted and reduced inter-
national trade, and after World War II U.S. involvementwas at an even
lower level——only about 4 per cent in the 1950's and l960's(Lipsev,
1971, p. 554). Starting in 1970, the trade links began to becomestronger,
until by the early 1980's the ratio had doubled, withmerchandise exports
at about 8 per cent of CNP (Table 1).
The comparison of merchandiseexports with GNP understates the U.S.
links with the rest of the world since much of CNPconsists of the produc-
tion of services, omitted from merchandiseexports, and that part of GNP
has been growing steadily. Exports of goods andservices are now 12—13
per cent of GNP, as compared with 6 per cent in the l960's, and merchan-
dise exports are close to 20 per cent ofgoods production alone, as
compared to 8 per cent of total GNP. The trade links with therest of
the world are much stronger for U.S. goodsproduction than for service
production: exports of services are about 10per cent of service industry
output if factor incomes (mainly profits on direct investmentabroad) are
included in services, and only 3—1/2per cent if factor incomes are
*Queens College, City University of New York, and National Bureau of
Economic Research.—2—
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1960—64 5.8 3.8 7.8 4.9 2.4
1965—69 6.0 3.8 7.9 5.2 2.6
1970—74 7.6 4.9 10.9 6.1 2.8
1975—79 10.2 6.7 15.1 7.8 3.4
1980—81 12.7 8.1 18.6 9.8 3.6
Source: Table A—i.—3—
excluded.Furthermore, the export ratio for services has been growing
much lessrapidly than that for goods. Thus the rise in the share of
servicesinGNP has tended to hold back the increase in exporting.
All of these statements about exporting apply equally or even more
strongly to imports, since U.S. imports were rising more rapidly than
exports. Thus the rise in exports does not represent a gain in the
competitiveness of the United States in the world economy but rather an
increasing degree of integration: closer ties with the rest of the world.
The rise in U.S. trade/output ratios reflects two developments. One
is a very long—run trend in the world economy, discussed below. The other
is the change in the relation of U.S. growth to world economic growth.
At least from the 1870's through the 1930's or even the early 1950's the
ratios of exports and imports to commodity output declined in the United
States (Lipsey, 1971, p. 554). One reason was that the United States was
growing rapidly relative to its trading partners; both its markets and
sources of supply were growing comparatively slowly. Since the 1950's
the reverse has been true. The United States has been growing more
slowly than its major trading partners; it is therefore selling to more
rapidly growing markets and buying from more rapidly growing producers.
The rise in the importance of trade in the national economy is not
particularly a U.S. phenomenon. It is evident in the data for the major
European countries, Canada, and Japan as well. In every case the ratios
of both exports and imports to goods production rose during the 1970's,
as did the ratios of trade to GM' (Table 2). However, the move towards
a greater importance of trade was larger in the United States than in
any of the other countries, on both the export side and the import side.—4—
TABLE2
Changein Ratios of Merchandise Exports and Imports to Goods
Output, Seven Countries
1970 to 1980
Ratios of Trade to Goods Production
Exports Imports
1980/19701979/1970 1980/19701979/1970







Source: International Economic Indicators, U.S. Department
of Commerce, International Trade Administration,
June 1982.—5—
The increase in the proportion of output traded has beena charac-
teristic ofthe years sinde World War II, but it isalso part of a much
largerand longer trend for the world as a whole. Simon Kuznets calcu-
lated that over the century from 1800 to thebeginning of World WarI
theworld ratio of trade (exports plus imports) tooutput rose from
approximately 3 per cent to about one third (Kuznets, 1964 and 1967).
Thisenormous growth of trade was presumably due to the great decline
in the cost of transportation and communication and theimprovement In
itsquality. World War I, the depression of the 1930's, and World War
II all tended to reduce this ratio somewhat, but theupward trend has
resumedsince the l950's and continued with few interruptions.
The sector of the U.S. economy perhaps shifting moststrongly to:ard
dependenceon the rest of the world in recentyears has been agriculture.
Agriculture had always been more export—oriented than the rest of the
U.S. economy, exports being 10—15 per centof agriculturalgross product
even before the Civil War, when the ratio for all products was only 6or
7per cent. The ratio rose to over 20 percent at the end of the 19th
Centuryand during the 1920's. In the Great Depression of the 1930's,
agricultural dependence on trade declined, but since World War II,more
andmore of U.S. agricultural production has gone into exports (Lipsey,
1971, p. 556). In the 1960's agricultural exports weremore than a
quarterof gross farmoutputand, by a better measure of trade dependence,
agriculturalexports were about 15 per cent of farm rnarketings (Table 3)1
1
The comparison with marketings is a better measure since both
exports and marketings are measures of sales, not net of intermediate
inputs,while gross farm output nets out a large amount of suchinputs.—6—
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Bythe 1980's the ratio of exports to gross farmincomewas over 60 per
centand the share of farm sales made abroad was over 30 per cent.
TheCommodity Composition of U.S. Merchandise Trade
Large changes have been taking place in the commodity composition
of U.S. merchandise trade. As the economy of the United States developed,
its export trade steadily shifted toward finished manufactures, from
less than ten per cent in the early 19th Century to 60 per cent in the
1960's (Lipsey, 1971, p. 568), and that proportion has remained relatively
constant since then. On the import side, on the other hand, manufactures
started out as the main item——more than half the total in the first half
of the 1800's——and then declined in importance as U.S. manufacturing
capacity grew. By the 1920's, and still in the first decade after World
War II, finished manufactures were less than 20 per cent of U.S. imports.
Then, beginning in the 1950's, there was a shift in the composition of
importsback toward finished manufactures, their share rising to over half
at the beginning of the 1970's (Table 4).After that time, of course, the
enormous rise in oil prices shifted the composition of imports toward crude
materials, but most of that growth was at the expense of food imports; the
share of finished manufactures remains close to half. Thus with respect
to the share of finished manufactures in imports, the United States has
returned to itspattern ofthe early 19thCentury, although the export
distribution is very different. Insteadof exchanging foods and raw
materials for finished manufactures, the United States is nowto a large
extent exchanging finished manufactures for other finished manufactures.
Within the rising trade in manufactures, the most rapidly growing
segmentshave been machinery, transport equipment, and instruments.—8—
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These rose from 35 to about 45 per cent of total exports and from 57 to
about 67 per cent of manufactured exports between 1960 and 1980 (U.S.
Bureauof the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, various
issues). Within this fast—growing group the leading commodities were
electronic computers, parts and accessories, telecommunications equipment,
air conditioning equipment, and instruments, which more than doubled their
shares of total and manufacturing exports over these 20 years.
The comparative advantage of the United States has been thought of
for many years as being concentrated in machinery and transport equipment,
particularly capital goods. These and automotive vehicles and parts
accounted for over a third of U.S. exports in the early 1960's and over 40 per
cent in the 1970's (Table 5). What has changed markedly is the position of
these same two groups of commodities on the import side, growing from
less than 10 per cent to almost a quarter of imports. The automobile
case is best known, involving both the greatly increased share of Japanese
cars in the U.S. market and the operation of the Canada—U.S. Auto
Agreement, which promotes both exports and imports of automotive products.
The rise in imports of capital goods is equally impressive, particularly
in view of the fact that it has taken place in the presumed area of U.S.
comparative advantage. There are, however, several important differences
between the capital goods and automotive groups. For one thing, in the
latter group the value of U.S. exports has been below that of imports
since the late 1960's, while in capital goods there is still a large
surplus, running at over $50 billion per year in the early 1980's.
Secondly, there has been a marked slackening in the rate of growth of
capital goods imports relative to that of exports of capital goods,— 10—
TABLE5
Relation of Exports and Imports of Capital Goods and Automotive
Vehicles to Total Merchandise Trade
Per Cent of Total
Merchandise Exports














1960—64 28.1 6.1 4.7 3.5
1965—69 31.6 9.0 8.5 9.4
1970—74 33.3 9.9 10.3 14.3
1975—79 33.5 10.6 10.5 12.7
1980—81 34.4 8.0 12.8 11.2
Source: Table A—4.— 11—
althoughthe import growth rate may still be a bit higher. Rapidly as
imports have grown, however, the export surplus on capital goods was far
larger relative to CNP in the late 1970's and early 1980's than in the
1960's (Table 6). There were wide swings in the surplus with large
increases in 1974 and 1975, followed by a gradual decline, and then
another large increase in 1980. The increases seemed to have roughly
coincided with both the two major oil price increases and U.S. recessions.
Most of the sharp changes in the surplus were in U.S. exports rather than
imports.
The items contributing to the growth of both surpluses and deficits
in the machinery trade account can be identified more precisely. Items
on which the trade deficit increased more rapidly than the CNP, and for
which we may therefore infer erosion of American comparative advantage
included telecommunications equipment, even though, as mentioned earlier,
it was one of the fastest—growing items of U.S. exports (Table A—6). Items
producing increasing trade surpluses, relative to GM?, included office
machines, because of the contribution of electronic computers and acces—
ones, aircraft and parts, n.e.c., and professional, scientific, and
controlling instruments. All were products for which not only exports but
also imports were rising very rapidly. In all three products imports were
growing more rapidly than exports for the first period calculated, 1965 to
1970, but in only one product, office machines, did the higher rate of
growth persist over 15 years. Even in this case, the rate of growth of
imports declined over the period, until in the last 5 years it was barely
larger than that of exports. Thus it would be inadvisable to project into
the future a more rapid rate of growth on one side of the trade account— 12—
TABLE6
Export Surplus on Capital Goods









Source: Table A—5.— 13—
relativeto the other, particularly if the more rapid growth is associated
with low initial values.
The Geographical Distribution of U.S. Merchandise Trade
There has been a major shift of merchandise exports away from
developed market economies since 1965, particularly in foods and
related products and in chemicals (Table 7). For total trade, the
increases in exports were mainly to the OPEC countries and the centrally
planned economies, but there was also an increase in the share of other
developing countries. In food products, the major shift was from
developed market economies especially to centrally planned economies,
but there was also a substantial shift to OPEC countries. In chemicals,
mostof the fall in the share of developed market economies went to
developing countries other than OPEC, mainly in Latin America and Asia.
The decline in the developed countries' share of U.S.exports was smaller
inmachineryand transport equipment than in the other twogroups we
discuss(partly as a consequence of the Canada—U.S. Auto Agreement) and
the main gain was in exports to OPEC countries. While thegains in
shares of the OPEC countries were not very large in terms ofpercentages
of total exports, because their original shares were so low, it should
be mentioned that theywere large relative to the original levels. There
wereincreases in OPEC shares of exports ranging from about 50per cent
to more than double.
On the whole, it appears that U.S. merchandise exnorts shifted toa
substantialdegree away fromother Industrialcountries and towards developing
countriesandthecentrally planned economies. The shift to OPEC, among the— 14—
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Per Cent of Total Trade
TotalExports
1965 67.2 5.127.1 0.5
1980 59.8 8.128.5 3.6
1980—1965 —7.4 +3.0 +1.4 +3.1
Foods, Beverages, and Tobacco
1965 63.7 3.332.0 1.0
1980 48.5 8.1 30.5 12.9
1980—1965 —15.2 +4.8—1.5 +11.9
Chemicals
1965 63.9 4.231.5 0.4
1980 51.4 6.340.2 2.1
1980—1965 —12.5 +2.1+8.7 +1.7
Machinery and Transport Equipment
1965 66.2 7.326.4 0.1
1980 60.1 10.628.2 1.1
1980—1965 —6.1 +3.3+1.8 +1.0
Total Irnports
1965 66.8 7.624.8 0.7
1980 50.7 23.125.2 1.0
1980-l965 —16.1 +15.5 +0.4 +0.3
Foods, Beverages, and Tobacco
1965 36.9 4.257.8 1.1
1980 40.7 4.552.8 1.9














55.7 24.3 1965 19.8
1980 11.8 62.7 25.2 0.3
1980—1965 —8.0 +7.0 +0.9 +0.3
Chemicals
1965 84.2 1.713.6 0.6
1980 84.6 0.711.5 3.2
1980—1965 +0.4 —1.0—2.1 +2.6
Machinery andTransport Equipment
0.2 1.6 0.2 1965 98.0
1980 87.1 0.112.4 0.4
1980—1965 —10.9 —0.1 +10.8 +0.2
Source: Table A—7.— 16—
developingcountries, presumably was in large measure a consequence of
the increase in OPEC countries' income from the rise in oil prices. The
United States was able to offset about a third of the rise in its oil
import bill between 1965 and 1975 directly by this increase in exports
to OPEC countries. The 1979—80 jump in oil prices reduced the offset
to only about 20 per cent, but that is because the expansion of U.S.
exports to the oil exporting countries takes some time to develop.
As Branson (1981) has pointed out, the reallocation of U.S. resources
stemming from the oil price increases and the income gains of oil pro-
ducers is not confined to this direct route. Much of the income of the
oil producers is channeled into international financial markets and
borrowed by the rapidly growing developing countries. Part of their
borrowings are then used to finance purchases of capital goods from the
United States, so that some of the gain we describe in U.S. exports to
non—oil developing countries may be an indirect consequence of the oil
boom and an indirect way of financing U.S. oil imports.
Another way of describing the direct shift in U.S. exports is to
say that in 1965 U.S. exports went 2/3 to developed countries and 1/3 to
developing countries, overall and in food products, chemicals, and
machinery and transport equipment. By 1980, all the developed country
shares were 60 per cent or less, and for food products and chemicals,
about half or less. Still, it is worth pointing out that developed
countriesaccounted for half or more of increases in exports overall
and in the two groups other than foods. The developed countries, despite
the major geographical shifts in trade, remain the main markets for U.S.
exports.— 17—
Onthe import side the geographical shifts have beenlarger. The
most notable in the aggregate are the rise in the OPEC countries' share
of U.S. imports and the corresponding decline in theproportion coming from
developed countries, both much greater than the reorientation on the
export side. While part of this shift was a rise in the OPEC share within
the fuels category, a large part in addition reflected thegreat increase
in the importance of the fuels category resulting from the OPECprice
increases.
Within the broad categories shown here, the major change, outside of
that in fuels, and perhaps the most important for thefuture, was in U.S.
imports of machinery and transport equipment. There was a decline in the
developed countries' share, which had been almost 100 per cent, and a
rise in that of the non—OPEC developing countries——mainly Asian. In1965
they accounted for less than 2 per cent of U.S. imports of machinery and
equipment and by 1980 their share had risen to 12 per cent.
The shift in aggregate imports can be summarized bysaying that in
1965 two—thirds of U.S. importscamefrom developed countries, a quarter
from non—OPEC developing countries, and less thana tenth from OPEC. By
1980, the developed country share had fallen to one—half, aboutequal to
that of all developing countries. The latter sharewas almost evenly
split between OPEC and non—OPEC countries. The non—OPECdeveloping
country share changed little, although its commodity composition was
altered.
The U.S. Role in World Merchandise Trade
The United States has accounted for a declining share ofworld
merchandise trade for some years, but that is acomparatively recent— 18—
phenomenon.The share of the United States approximately doubled during
the 19th Century and again during the first half of the 20th Century.
Until the 1880's most of the U.S. gains were at the expense of the largely
agricultural exporters of Eastern and Southern Europe. For the next
70 years or so they were largely at the expense of the countries of
industrial Europe, which bore the heaviest burden of twodevastating
World Wars. The difference between the two periods reflects the change
in the character of the United States from a largely agricultural
exporter in the 19th Century to a heavily Industrialized countryinthe
20th Century.
Since the 1950's the U.S. share in world trade has fallen steadily.
To some extent this has reflected the recovery from World War II of the
economies of Western Europe and Japan. However, the 1950's were a turning
point in a broader sense, being the end of a period of 150 years In which
U.S. population and income were growing relative to the rest of the world.
Since then, the U.S. shares of world population and income have fallen.
Thus the norm against which to measure changes in the U.S. share of trade
should probably be something other than a constant share. For example,
the U.S. share of world population fell by 16 per cent between 1950 and
1980 and the U.S. share of world industrial production and industrial
production in manufacturing fell by 22 per cent between 1960 and 1980
(UN Statistical Yearbook and Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, various Issues).
Most of the declines in the U.S. share of output came before 1975. Whatever
the reasons for these declines in population and production growth rates,
they presumably reflect causes outside the trade area.- 19-
TheU.S. share in world merchandise exports declined almost continu-
ously from 1950 through the end of the 1970's (Table 8). Between 1960
and 1979 that share fell by a third, considerably more than the decline In
the U.S. share of world income or population, and the loss in U.S. shares
seemed to accelerate during the 1970's instead of slowing down. Among the
malor areas of U.S. comparative advantage, there was an increase of the U.S.
share in exports of foods, beverages, and tobacco in the l970's butlarge
declines in shares in chemicals and machinery and transport equipment.
The pattern of changes in U.S. shares of developed marketeconomy exports
was similar, with one exception: in the early 1970's the U.S. share of
world exports fell much more rapidly than its share ofdeveloped—country
exports. The reason for the difference Is in the developed market
economy share of world exports. Despite the rapid growth of some develop-
ing countries, the share of developed market economies in worldexports
steadily increased through the early 1970's. Then, in 1973 and 1974 the
enormous rise in the price of oil, largely a developing country export,
sharplyincreased the share of these countries in world exports,reducing
the shares of the United States and other developed countries. After
1974the developed country share crept up again until the secondlarge oil
price Increase in 1979 again reversed the trend, at least temporarily.
1979 and 1980 showed some reversal of the long decline in U.S. shares
of developed country merchandise exports. That reversal was observable
in each of the three groups shwri here as well as in the total. Tojudge
by the U.S. share in exports of developed market economies, the U.S.
share in world exports may have stopped declining in 1977 andmay even
have risen a bit since then, despite the rise in oil prices in 1979—80.— 20—
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1970 15.413.7 12.3 17.5 19.9
1975 13.612.2 16.1 14.3 18.7
1976 12.8
1977 11.8




U.S.Exports as Per Cent of Developed Market Economy Exports
1955 25.5
1960 23.9
1965 21.1 26.1 22.6 25.5
1970 19.0 20.8 19.7 22.7
1975 18.4 25.5 16.4 21.5
1978 16.1 22.8 16.0 18.4
1980 16.9 23.3 17.7 19.6




1966 69.9 58.2 88.5 86.8
1970 71.9 59.0 88.9 87.6
1975 66.1 63.2 87.4 87.0
1978 67.6 61.4 90.7 86.5
1979 65.9
apercent of merchandise exports of market economies.
bper cent of world merchandiseexports.
Source:Table A—8 and [nrnationa1 Economic Indicators, June
1982, U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade
Administration.— 21—
However,it is not yet clear how much of the U.S.increaseis the result
of cyclical factors.
TheTerms ofTrade
The developed countries in general, and the United States as a part
of that group, have in the last decade suffered sharp declines in their
terms of trade. This is particularly true for the terms of trade for
their exports of manufactures to developing countries relative to their
imports from those countries. Our best estimate of this decline, which
includes some correction for improvements in the quality of capital goods,
is something like 50 per cent between the 1960's and the late 1970's
(Table 9). Much of this decline stems from the rise in the price of oil,
of course, but even if oil is omitted from primary products one finds a
largefall——perhaps about 25 per cent. Thus there was an important rise
in the relative prices of primary products compared with manufactured
goods.
A longer view of the terms of tradeshows little net change over the
wholespan of yearsfrom the 1870's or 1890'sto the early 1950's before
therecent fall. However, the real lesson of the long perspective is
that there is no clear trend. Instead, there are large fluctuations that
eventually reverse themselves. Thus we would not expect a continuation
of the deteriorating terms of trade for developed countries of the last
two decades. In fact, the last few years have been more favorable, in
this sense, to the developed countries.— 22—
TABLE9
TermsofTrade Between Manufactures Exports of

















Based on manufactures and primary products
price indexes from Kindleberger.
b
Based on manufactures price index from
Maizels and primary products price index from
Kindleberger.
Source: Kravis andLipsey(1981).— 23—
U.S.Direct Investment Abroad
Sources and Direction of Investment
The chief vehicle for the transmission of new products and new
technologies in the 19th century and earlier were migration and trade.
The fact that Great Britain attempted to restrict the emigration of
skilled textile workers showed that the notion of technological leads
and their value in giving a country advantages in trading with others
is a very old one. The establishment of many American industries in the
19thcenturywasassociated with the immigration of particular natlonali—
ties.For example, Germans founded most American breweries, and the names
of the companies today still show their origin.
With the growth of large enterprises, and especially large manufac--
turing enterprises, at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th
century, a new form of technology transfer came into existence. That was
direct investment: the ownership of a factory or a sales or service
establishment in one country by a company from another country. There
had been international banking partnerships earlier, and companies forrnd
in one country for the exploitation of mines or other resources abroad,
but direct investment in foreign manufacturing came to be the character-
istically American form of foreign investment. Two of the earliest American
investors, carrying American inventions abroad, were the Singer Sewing
MachineCompany and the International Harvester Company.
American direct investment expanded rapidlyafter World War II and
particularlyin the 1960's but the flow showed somewhat in the 1970's,
not in nominal terms, but in real terms, using any reasonable deflator.2
2
Thesegeneral descriptions of recent developments in direct invest-
ment are drawn mainly from OECD (1981) and Christelow (1982).— 24—
Almostall direct investment——close to 95 per cent——comes from the
developed industrial countries. The two major sources, the U.S. and the
U.K., accounted for about 70 per cent of the stock of all direct invest—
ment in 1967 but less than 60 per cent in 1976, with Germany, Japan, and
to a smaller extent, Switzerland, replacing them (Table 10). Changes in
the sources of direct investment flows have been more startling: the
United States down from 61 per cent in 1961—67 to 29 per cent in 1974—79,
and Germany and Japan up from 14 per cent to 40 per cent.3 On the other
hand, the United States became a major destination of direct investment
from other countries during the same period. Of direct investment flows
to developed countries, the United States received only 3 per cent in
1961—67 and 27 per cent in 1974—78. At the same time, some traditionally
heavy recipients of direct investment had their shares reduced sharply.
Canada and Australia, for example, received 32 per cent of the flow to
developed countries in 1961—67 and only 13 per cent in the later period.
To some extent the shift in direct investment flows probably reflected
changes in currency values. The overvaluation of the dollar in the 1960's
addedto the incentives for the export of funds while the possible under-
valuation of the dollar inthe1970'swasan attraction for investment.
The relatively high valuation of U.S. equities during 1961—67 ($1.15per
dollar of market value of net worth) and the much lower valuation in the
3
Since these figures omit retained earnings theyexaggerate the
decline in supply of U.S.—owned equity funds.—25—
TABLE 10
Shares of Developed Country Direct Investment Stocks and Flows
U.S. U.K. GermanyJapanSwitzerlandCanadaAustralia
Share inStock of Direct Investment Owned by Developed Countries
1967 53.816.6 2.8 1.4 4.8 3.5 NA
1971 52.315.0 4.6 2.8 6.0 4.1 NA
1976 47.611.2 6.9 6.7 6.5 3.9 NA
Share inOutflow of Direct Investment from Developed Countries
0.7 1961—67 61.1 8.7 7.2 2.4 NA 2.3
1968—7345.8 9.1 12.5 6.7 NA 4.5 1.4
1974—7929.3 9.2 17.0 13.0 NA 6.2 16a
Share inInf low of Direct Investment to Developed Countries
2.6 9.7 21.3 8.2 NA 16.2 15.6 1961—67
1968—7311.4 7.4 16.4 8.2 NA 12.1 12.9
1974—7926.7 6.1 14.7 15.2 NA 3.2 95a
a
1974—7 6.
Source: OECD, 1981.— 26—
lastperiod ($.52 per dollar of market value of net worth)4 may also
have had some influence on the direction of these flows.
Aside from these very large shifts in resource flows among developed
countries there was also a modest gain in the share of developing coun-
tries, from 30 per cent in 1965—69 to 33 per cent in 1975—79. However,
the newly industrializing countries, or NIC's (Brazil, Greece, Israel,
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Spain, and Taiwan), increasedtheir share
of direct investment) inf lows from 10 to 15½ per cent, partly at the
expense of OPEC and other developing countries.
Bearing in mind the minor role of developing countries in U.S.
direct investment in general it is of interest to mention one other
trend. U.S. parent companies have always been reluctant to share owner-
ship in affiliates, despite the pressure in this direction fromhost
country governments. Of the multinationals' affiliates surveyedin the
Harvard program that were established before 1951, 58 per cent of the
U.S.—owned affiliates, 39 per cent of European affiliates, and 27 per
cent of affiliates of firms in other countries werewholly—owned.5 All
these proportions had decreased by thelate1960's, to 46, 19, and 6 per
cent, but the preference of U.S. firms for 100 per cent ownershipremains
clear.
While there has been some shift by U.S. parents towards sharing of
ownershipmost ofU.S.—owned production abroad is in majority-owned
affiliates:about3/4 in developed countries and 85 per cent in develop-
ing countries (Table 11). The ratio for the latter group, however,
4
Caganand Lipsey (1978), Table 2—3
5
OECD (1981), p. 50.— 27—
TABLE11




Total Manufacturing 80.5 71.0
Drugs 93.8 86.0
Office and computing machines 94.7 97.5
Radio, TV, and communications equipment 94.1 77.6
Electronic components and accessories 80.5 95.3
Instruments and related products 89.2 76.8
Food and kindred products 85.5 83.0
Soaps, cleansers, etc. 96.6 88.6
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1981).— 28-
reflectsmainly the high proportion of production by majority—owned
firms in the petroleum industry in developing countries and the great
importanceof petroleum——well over half of total affiliate sales——in
these countries. Within manufacturing the relation is reversed; 80 per
cent of affiliate sales in developed countries and only 70 per cent
indeveloping countries are by majority—owned affiliates.
Thus the efforts by developing countries to gain substantial shares in
the equity of foreign—owned affiliates seem to have had some success.
One would expect that the more technologically oriented an industry
was or the more that it relied on proprietary information, the smaller
the willingness of the parent company to share information and the greater
the insistence on control or total ownership. It is thus not surprising
that in the more technologically—oriented industries the shares of sales
by majority—owned affiliates are higher than average. The two industries
relying heavily on advertising, foods and soaps and cleansers, also tend
to be dominated by majority—owned affiliates.
We have to modify our earlier statement, then, about the success in
forcing host—country partnership: it tends not tosucceed verywell in
technologically—orientedindustries.A corollary is that if it does
succeed, itmay only be at the cost of reducing investment.
U.S.—OwnedAffiliates and Host—Country Exports
Theeffects of direct investment on trade, particularly those of direct
investment in manufacturing, are usually analyzed in terms that suggest
that it is a substitute for exports from the home country. That may be
because capital movements in general, whether direct or portfolio, are
thought of as substitutes for trade, along the lines of the Mundell (1957)— 29
analysis.Or it maybebecause, as in the sore recent analyses specifi-
cally of direct investment, such investment is thought of as involving a
decision by the parent company as to whether to serve an essentially fixed
host—countrymarket byexporting from the home country or by host—country
production.6 However, the empirical examinations ofthe relation of home—
country exports to direct investment have almost all searched in vain for
any evidence of such substitution.
Another side of the concern with trade effects of direct investment has
been the fear among host countries that foreign—controlled subsidiaries are
prevented by their parent companies from competing with them outside the
host—country market, and that foreign ownership therefore impedes the devel-
opment of export industries. That issue has been discussed and studied
extensively in Canada in particular8 although the advantage of such a
policy to a parent maximizing its worldwide income is not obvious. On the
other hand, countries welcoming direct investment from abroad often look on
it as an aid to establishing or increasing exports because the foreign
owners bring previously unavailable technology, established marketing faci—
lities, or entree to the parents' home markets. In the United States, at
present, one of the chief concerns of trade policymakers is that host
countries are squeezing U.S. exports out of third—country markets by
forcing U.S.—owned affiliates to export as the price for host—countryper-
mission to invest or to take over existing firms. Again, Canada isa par—
6
For example, Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978), Swedenborg (1979),
and U.S. Tariff Commission (1973).
7
In addition to the studies in footnote 1, see Lipsey and Weiss (1981).
8
An early example Is the study by Safarian (1966).— 30-
ticularfocus of this concern although export requirements are increasingly
applied in developing countries.
Production for Export and for Local Sale
U.S.—owned manufacturing affiliates have always had as their main
markets the host countries within which they operate. In 1966,over 80 per
cent of sales were within the host countries, and the proportion of local
sales was over 90 per cent for affiliates in developing countries.
U.S.—Owned Manufacturing Affiliates




Although U.S. foreign production is heavily concentrated indeveloped
countries (about 85 per cent of sales in both 1966 and 1977)the number of
manufacturing affiliates in developing countries was almost 30per cent of
the total in 1966. Thus, the proportion of affiliatesengaged almost
entirely in host—country sales irust have been very large.
Although host—country sales remained the predominant businessof manu-
facturing affiliates in 1977, there had clearly been amajor shift in their
activity. The share of exports in total sales rose from 16per cent in
1957 to 19 per cent in 1966 and to 31per cent in 1977, and this shift took
place in both developed and developing countries (Table]2).Among the deve-
loping countries the overall rise in the export ratiowas very large: from 8
to 18 per cent (Table 12).There was a very large increase in theexport
ratio for the group of countries called "Other Asia andPacific, except
India, Indonesia and the Philippines," principally
I-long Kong, Singapore,
Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Korea, as well as a rise in theimportance of
that group among the developing countries.Affiliates in these countries
had been comparatively export_orientedeven in 1957 and 1966 (12 per cent Of— 31—
TABLE12
U.S. Majority—Owned Manufacturing Affiliatesa
Relations Among Sales, Exports, and Exports to the U.S.





Exports tothe U.S.as PerCentof
Total Sales TotalExports
195119661977195719661977195719661977
All Countries 15.918.630.8 6.0 5.6 9.137.5 30.14 29.14
Developing countries 17.7 20.14 33.1 6.6 6.1 9.136.929.9 27.3
Canada 16.016.129.910.513.226.165.781.787.2
Europe 21.625.837.7 3.0 2.1 2.313.9 8.3 6.1
Developing countries 5.3 8.14 18.1 2.6 3.2 9.1 149.037.9 50.2
Latin America 14.2 6.2 9.7 1.7 2.2 3.6 140.235.6 37.3
Other Asiab 20.723.2>55.2 6.3 9.833.5 30.2 142.5 60.8
Other Asia, n.e.c. l8.2c142•3d >73•3d1l.14c <25•9d>147•1d62.Sc <25•9d614.3d
aExcept 25 per cent—owned and over in 1957.
bExciuding Japan and Middle East.
cExciudingIndia and the Philippines.
dExciuding India, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1960), (1975), and (1981).— 32—
sales)and by 1977, almost three quarters of their sales were for export.
For U.S. affiliates in developed countries, exports to the United
States were only about 30 per cent of total exports in both 1966 and 1977,
and even in the later year remained less than 10 per cent of their sales.
Only foraffiliates in Canada was the U.S.market of major importance (a
quarterof sales) and this high ratio was partly attributable to the trade
in automobiles and parts resulting from the U.S.—Canadian auto agreement.
U.S.affiliates in developing countries didshift their exports to the
UnitedStates to some degree (38to50per cent of exports) but the U.S.
marketstill accounted for less than 10 per cent of sales in 1977. Even
that was a large rise from1957.The chief exceptions once again were the
small Asian countries, for whom exports to the U.S. reached well over half
of exports in 1977 and probably about 50 per cent of their total sales,
four or five times the 1957 share.
In general, then, exporting to the United States has been a relatively
minor activity of U.S. manufacturing affiliates in foreign countries for the
last twenty years. The major exceptions to this generalization are the
affiliates in the small Asian countries, for which the United States is a
major market, accounting for roughly half of their sales, and those in
Canada. The chief trends in affiliate activity over the twenty years have
been the rise in export orientation of affiliates in most parts of the
world, but particularly in the small Southeast Asian countries, the shift
away from exporting to the United States by European affiliates, and the
shift towards the United States as a market by those in Canada and in Asian
developing countries.
To some extent, the differences between affiliates in developed
countries and those in developing areas may have reflected the industry
composition of activities in the two types of host countries. Affiliates in— 33—
developedcountries were more heavily involved with sales of machinery
and transportation equipment and those in developing countries with sales
of food products and chemicals (Table 13). However, there was considerable
convergence in the industry composition of the two groups of countries:
in particular from the large fall in importance of food products and rise
in machinery sales among affiliates in the developing countries.
In data for the major investing industries we find several common
characteristics and developments. Affiliates in all industries worldwide
became more export—orient ed, and the same was true for affiliates in the
great majority of regions, including those in Europe for all the industries.
However, even in the most export—oriented' industries, the affiliates in
the aggregate sold mainly in their own countries——the great bulk of U.S.—
owned foreign production was still for local sale in 1977. The exceptions
were machinery in Southeast Asia and in some of the smaller European
countries, as well as motor vehicles in Canada.
Exports to the United States were a small part of total sales in almost
all industries and regions: the exceptions were affiliates in Canada In two
industries and machinery producing affiliates in the developing countries
of Asia. In other words exporting to the United States was not a major
reason for the establishment or development of U.S. production abroad in
most cases.
The Role of U.S. Affiliates in Exports
The rapid growth in exports of manufactured goods by foreign affiliates
of U.S. companies reflects, to some extent, the growth of the economies in
which they are located and the worldwide rise in trade relative to output.
To try to learn what role the U.S. affiliates played in the trade of their— 34—
TABLE13
Industry Distribution of Sales of U.S. Majority—Owned Manufacturing Affiliates
1966 and 1977
Total Sales Per CentDistribution
1957 1966 1977 1957 1966 1977
All Countries
18,331 147,375194,200 100.0 100.0100.0 Total Manufacturing
Food products 2,1487 5,644 21,756 13.6 11.9 11.2
Chemicals 2,411 7,421 32,396 13.2 15.7 16.7
Primary and fabricated metals 1,5148 3,9014 11,560 8.14 8.2 6.0
Machinery 3,95010,902 147,059 21.5 23.0 214.2
Transportation equipment 4,22811,156 148,685 23.1 23.5 25.1
Other 3,707 8,3148 32,71414 20.1 17.6 16.9
Developed Countries
15,617 40,1486163,922 100.0100.0100.0 Total Manufacturing
Food products 1,811 4,169 17,148 11.6 10.3 10.5
Chemicals 1,835 5,897 25,930 11.8 14.6 15.8
Primary and fabricated metals 1,399 3)407 9,893 9.0 8.4 6.0
Machinery 3,66010,009 40,1450 23.14 214.7 214.7
Transportation equipment 3,68510,112 43,205 23.6 25.0 26.14
Other 3,227 6,892 27,296 20.7 17.0 16.7
Developing Countries





























Transportation equipment 5143 1,0414 5)461 20.0 15.2 18.0
(tr 480 1,457 5,465 17.7 21.1 18.0
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1960), (1975), and (1981).— 35—
hostcountries we compare their exports and export growth with those of
their countries.
U.S. manufacturing affiliates accounted for about 10 per cent of
exports of manufactures by "market economies," which we shall henceforth
refer to as world exports, in 1977 (Table 14). The move towards greater
export orientation, referred to earlier, is reflected here in the fact that
exports by U.S. affiliates grew faster than host—country exports in every
one of the regions in Table 14 or, in other words, that the share of aff ii—
iates in exports increased in each one. A somewhat surprising aspect of
the table is that U.S. affiliates were considerably more important in the
exports of developed countries, even aside from Canada, where they
accounted for a majority of exports, than in the developing countries.
U.S. affiliates had the largest share of exports in Singapore ——overa
fifth ——andpossibly in a couple of other Southeast Asian countries,
although in those cases we may have failed to adjust the SITC export data
sufficiently. The U.S. shares were also large ——15per cent
or so, in the U.K., Belgium, the Netherlands, Brazil, and Mexico, and even
larger in Ireland.
In no area, aside from Canada, were U.S. affiliates responsible for a
ld-ge part of the growth in exports, the shares in growth being 10 per cent
or less. In individual countries, however, the ratio reached the range of
15—20 per cent and even higher in Indonesia and the Philippines. In many,
but not all cases, the major export success stories were also associated
with relatively high shares of U.S. firms in both exports and export
growth. This was the case, for example, for Belgium—Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Ireland, Spain, Brazil, and Mexico. Several ofTABLE 14
— 36—
All Manufacturing Industries
Relation of Exports by U.S. Majority—Owned Affiliates to Total Host—Country Exports
1966 and 1977
Exports: Exports by U.S. Affiliates
1977/1966 as % of Total Exports
U.S. Corrected
Affil— All Conarab1e Data Data
iates Firms8-l966b 1977b 1977
Change in Exports:
U.S. Affiliates
as % of Total
1966 to 1977b
All Countries 6.8 5.7 8.0 9.5 9.9 9.9
Developed countries 6.6 5.6 8.8 10.3 10.3 10.6
Canada 5.9 14.6 145.2 57.6 57.6 61.0
Europe 7.0 5.14 7.14 9.6 9.7 10.1
Developing countries 9.5 6.0 3.5 5.5 7.2 6.0
Latin America 6.5 5.1 5.6 7.2 10.14 7.6
Other Asiac 13.1—14.9 9.2 3.9 5.5—6.36.3—7.2 5.7—6.6
aNot fully adjusted to coverage of affiliate data.
not fully adjusted to coverage of affiliate data.
cExciuding Japan and Middle East.
Source: u.S.Department of Commerce (1975) and (1981) and United
InternationalTrade Statistics.
Nations, Yearbook of— 37—
these,it may be recalled, were also the countries in which U.S. affiliates
were particularly export—oriented.
The exporting of machinery, the most important industry group for U.S.
direct investment abroad, has traditionally been the preserve of producers
in developed countries. Between 1966 and 1977, however, there was an enor-
mous increase in exports by developing countries——to perhaps about thirty
times the earlier level (Table 15). The exports of U.S. affiliates reflected
these trends, those from developed countries rising to a little under six
times the earlier level while those from developing countries reached almost
60 times the 1966 level. Another way of describing the change is that the
share of exports by U.S. firms (other than from the U.S.) supplied from
developing countries rose from less than 2 per cent to about 17 per cent.
Another contrast between the developed and developing countries in
machinery exports was that while U.S. affiliates' exports from developing
countries increased about twice as fast as exports in general, those in
developed countries rose a little less quickly than exports of the industry
as a whole (Table 15). However, in the European countries, affiliate
exports rose faster than those of the average firm; what brought down the
share of affiliates for developed countries in the aggregate was mainly the
large growth of Japanese machinery exports, in which U.S. firms played a
very small role. U.S. affiliates accounted for a little over 10 per cent
of the increase in developed country exports but for almost a third of the
rise in developing countries, and around half or more for such countries as
Mexico, Malaysia, and Singapore.— 38—
TABLE15
Machinery
Relation of Exports by U.S. Majority—Owned Manufacturing Affiliates



















All Countries 5.9 NA NA 12.7 NA NA
Developed countries 5.7 6.id12.5 11.8 11.3 ii.6d
Canada .1 4.2 3.6 35.2 35.2 34.9
Europe 6.0 5•5dl2.1 13.5 12.6 137d
Developing countries 57.1 <29.9<16.3 31.1 NA 31.7
Latin America 34.8 NA NA 0.7 NA NA
Other Asiac 6l.1_65.I <29.0<13.6 28.6—30.6 NA 29.2—31.2
aNot fully adjusted to coverage of affiliate data.
not fully adjusted to coverage of affiliate data.
CExcluding Japan and Middle East.
dlncomplete data for host—country exports.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1975) and (1981) and United Nations, Yearbook of
International Trade Statistics.— 39—
Summary
The mainrecent developments we find in U.S. trade and investment are
the following:
1. There has been a steady increase in the strength of the links, via
trade, between the U.S. economy and that of the rest of the world,
much more in goods than in services. U.S. agriculture, in particular,
has increased its dependence on world markets.
2. The pattern of U.S. trade has shifted toward the exchange of U.S.
finished manufactures for foreign finished manufactures. While imports
of machinery and transport equipment have grown more rapidly than
exports, the United States has retained its comparative advantage in
non—automotive capital goods. That is, the export surplus on these
products has continued to increase relative to total U.S. output.
3. The geographical composition of U.S. exports has shifted away from
developed market economies toward OPEC, the centrally planned economies,
and, to a smaller extent, other developing countries. However, the
developed countries remain the main markets for U.S. exports.
The shift toward OPEC countries was stronger on the import side, as
a result of both the rise in importance of fuels and the rise of the
OPEC countries within that category. Another shift, perhaps more
important for the future, was the rise of developing Asian countries
as suppliers of machinery and equipment.
4. The U.S. share of world trade has continued to fall, even more than
the U.S. shares of population and aggregate production, but recent
years have shown a slowing, or even a reversal, of this trend. There— 40—
hasbeen a persistent tendency for the share of developed countries in
world exports to rise, the increase interrupted for a time but not
stopped by the oil price rises.
5. The terms of trade have shifted against manufactured exports of
developed countries in the last two decades. Even primary products
other than petroleum have risen in relative price. However, the
cycle seems to have turned again in the last few years in favor of
manufactured goods prices. If that continues it will Tepresent one
more example of the lack of any long—term trend in the rela don
between manufactured and primary product prices.
6. There has been a large shift in the sources of new direct investment
flows, excluding reinvested earnings, from the United States to
Germany and Japan. At the same time the United States has become an
important recipient of direct investment from abroad while traditional
absorbers of direct investment, such as Canada and Australia, have
declined in importance. The rising share of the United States probably
reflects the low price of the dollar during much of the 1970's and the
low stock market valuation of U.S. equities.
U.S. firms, under pressure from host countries, have accepted
more sharing of ownership. However, most of U.S. manufacturing activity
still takes place in majority—owned affiliates, especially in industries
with a large technology element in their activities.
7.Foreign manufacturing affiliates of U.S. firms are still basically
concerned mainly with selling in their host countries. However, they
have shifted substantially in the direction of exporting. The United
Stateshas never been an important market for most U.S.—owned affiliates— 41—
abroad,with the exception of those in Canada and in the small Asian
countries, and the latter have not only become more export—oriented
but have also shifted towards the United States as a market.
8. The shifttoward an export orientation of U.S.affiliates was reflected
ina rise in their shares of host—country exports in most areas of the
world.In themachinery industries the export increases were more
rapid in the developing countries and their share of all exports by
foreign affiliates of U.S. firms rose steeply. In these countries,
and in Europe as well, exports of machinery by U.S.—owned affiliates
increased more rapidly than those of other companies.— 42—
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Products etc. Product from Farm Farm
($million) —— -— — — MarketingsProduct
1960 4,800 34,337 20,178 14.0 23.8
1961 5,000 35,228 20,180 14.1 24.8
1962 5,000 36,349 20,405 13.8 24.5
1963 5,600 37,315 20,467 15.0 27.4
1964 6,300 37,099 19,260 17.0 32,7
1965 6,200 39,386 21,892 15.7 28.3
1966 6,900 43,512 22,824 15.9 30.2
1967 6,453 42,739 22,064 15.1 29.2
1968 6,297 44,203 22,552 14.2 27.9
1969 6,095 48,141 25,052 12.7 25.1
1970 7,374 50,436 25,774 14.6 28.6
1971 7,831 52,975 27,589 14.8 28.4
1972 9,513 61,441 31,907 15.5 29.8
1973 17,978 87,226 49,885 20.6 36.0
1974 22,412 92,676 47,738 24.2 46.9
1975 22,242 88,067 48,860 25.3 45.5
1976 23,381 94,463 45,905 24.8 50.9
1977 24,331 96,035 48,405 25.3 50.3
1978 29,902 112,494 58,743 26.6 50.9
1979 35,594 131,655 71,578 27.0 49.7
1980 42,156 139,521 65,365 30.2 64.5
1981 44,264 143,508 75,790 30.8 58.4
Source: U.S. National Income and Product Accounts.— 46—
TABLEA-3




Finished Manufactures Finished Manufactures
TotalManufacturesas Per Cent TotalManufacturesas Per Cent
— — ($million) —— of Total — — ($million) —— of Total
196019,459 10,574 54.3 15,068 5,276 35.0
196119,981 11,102 55.6 14,703 5,094 34.6
196220,717 12,065 58.3 16,326 5,995 36.7
196322,183 12,488 56.3 17,068 6,393 37.5
196425,479 14,265 56.0 18,749 7,377 39.3
196526,399 15,220 57.7 21,427 8,876 41.4
196629,054 16,763 57.7 25,618 11,710 45.7
196730,646 18,673 60.9 26,889 13,091 48.7
196833,626 21,036 62.6 33,226 16,897 50.9
196936,788 23,671 64.3 36,043 19,967 55.4
197042,029 26,001 61.9 39,963 22,463 56.2
197142,949 27,934 65.0 45,637 26,403 57.9
197248,436 30,929 63.9 55,561 32,752 58.9
197369,742 40,317 57.8 69,492 39,441 56.8
197496,512 56,536 58.6 101,043 48,400 47.9
1975105,612 65,822 62.3 96,954 46,435 47.9
1976113,087 71,099 62.9 121,838 57,805 47.4
1977117,867 74,921 63.6 145,780 66,149 45.4
1978140,828 87,035 61.8 173,215 88,679 51.2
1979178,178 103,808 58.3 207,104 99,551 48,1
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the U.S.,










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































U SExport Surplus on Capital Goods except Autonotive
Amountand Relation to GNP
1960—1981
Export Surplus Export Surplus
on on
Capital Goods Capital Goods
exc. exc.
Automotive GNP Automotive as
— — — — ($ million)—— — — Per Cent of GNP
1960 4,949 506,512 .98
1961 5,217 524,554 .99
1962 5,685 565,039 1.01
1963 5,781 596,714 .97
1964 6,424 637,719 1.01
1965 6,581 691,051 .95
1966 6,756 755,981 .89
1967 7,480 799,585 .94
1968 8,271 .95
1969 9,001 943,996 .95
1970 10,681 992,734 1.08
1971 11,038 1,077,619 1.02
1972 10,995 1,185,923 .93
1973 13,736 1,326,396 1.04
1974 21,059 1,434,220 1.47
1975 26,473 1,549,212 1.73
1976 26,830 1,718,018 1.56
1977 25,782 1,918,324 1.34
1978 27,227 2,163,863 1.26
1979 34,267 2,417,759 1.42
1980 43,856 2,633,108 1.67
1981 47,090 2,937,716 1.60
Source: U.S. National Income and Product Accounts.•
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